DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE
YEAR

Deemed the International Space Year,' 1992 continued to bring forth material developments in the
rapidly expanding world of international satellite
communications. Not only has the transmission of
voice and data become competitive, but with the
technological advances of direct broadcast services,
video compression, high data rate computer services
and high definition television, among others, the entire satellite market appears primed for a technological explosion. 2
The development of such services and similar ones
providing interactive capabilities will greatly increase
choices in personal communications.' The once futuristic concepts of telecommuting 4 and virtual reality5 are fast becoming today's reality. Modern satellite technology enables the remote rancher in
Australia or the climber in the Andes to be in touch
with the outside world within seconds. This capability creates monumental opportunities for third world
countries, where cable and fiber optic lines have yet
to be laid. Indeed, it is quite possible persons will be
able to communicate via satellite with virtually anyone in the world by the early twenty-first century.
The Communications
Satellite Corporation
'

Lloyd Covens, The Year Ahead: Satellite's Bright Vista,
Jan. 1992, at 17.
2
Id.
' The term "personal communications services" or "PCS" is
a term used often in the arena of emerging technologies. PCS is
a regulatory definition-a generic umbrella for a variety of mobile services. It does not define the various technologies involved.
Margie Semilof, Here Come the PCNs, COMMUNICATIONS
WEEK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 26.
" "Telecommuting . . . [is] the use of telecommunications
technology to partially or completely replace the commute to and
from work." It is estimated that "the number of home based
telecommuters in the United States has increased 2.5 times in
the past four years, from 2.2 million in 1988 to 5.5 million [currently] (4.4 percent of the workforce)." Patricia L. Mokhtarian,
Telecommuting in the United States: Letting Our Fingers Do
the Commuting, TR NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 2-3.
' "Virtual reality architectures almost literally invite users to
step into the world defined by the system. Sophisticated 1/O [input/output] devices, such as touch screens, goggles, heads up displays and data gloves, enable users to view and manipulate electronic information and images in three dimensions." James
SATELLITE COMM.,

("Comsat") was created by Congress in the 1962
Communications Satellite Act ("CSA") 6 and was authorized to serve as the United States private sector
commercial participant in the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization ("INTELSAT").' Comsat enjoyed a monopoly position over
international satellite communications from the
United States for nearly thirty years. Today, Comsat
no longer stands alone as the sole provider of satellite
communications services in the United States. Radical technological advances over the thirty years since
the implementation of the CSA have enabled competitors to enter the satellite services market, a development consistent with the United States' policy "not
...to preclude the creation of additional communications satellite systems . ..

."'

Congress created Comsat with the passage of the
CSA.' The goal was to create a commercial corporation which would operate as a part of the global
communications network"0 and serve as the United
States' signatory to INTELSAT and the International Maritime Satellite Organization ("INMARSAT"). Since its inception, Comsat has been regulated as a common carrier by the Federal
Kobielus, Virtual Reality May Transform Future Multimedia
Interfaces, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 25, 1991, at 33.
' Communications Satellite Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744
(1991) [hereinafter CSA].
' The United States entered into the INTELSAT Agreement on February 12, 1973. "INTELSAT is a cooperative
whose members make capital contributions commensurate with
their use of the system." Senior Interagency Group on Interna-

tional Communication and Information Policy White Paper on
New International Satellite Systems, p.2 1 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter SIG White Paper]; see CSA § 102(a), 47 U.S.C. § 701(a).
8 CSA § 102(d), 47 U.S.C. § 701(d).
' The stated policy goal of the CSA is an "improved global
communications network, which will be responsive to public

needs and national objectives, which will serve the communication needs of the United States and other countries, and which
will contribute to world peace and understanding."

CSA

§ 102(a), 47 U.S.C. § 701(a).
10 Id.
" Congress passed the International Maritime Satellite
Telecommunications Act designating Comsat the United States
representative. "Such system shall have facilities and services
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Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")' 2 under rate-of-return regulation. The rateof-return model of regulation, or cost-of-service, is
intended to prevent an entity with market power
from exercising monopoly power over the
marketplace."
The arrival of competitors to the international satellite environment may induce the Commission to alter or abandon that regulatory model as competition
grows. Today, there are a myriad of companies, such
as AT&T, Columbia, Ellipsat, Loral-Qualcomm,
Motorola, Orbital, PanAmSat, and TRW, vying for
the international as well as domestic satellite communications market. 4 As these and other firms enter
the market and mature, regulators will be forced to
consider whether the current activist economic regulation should be largely replaced by increased reliance on market forces.
This Comment focuses on several important and
timely issues of international satellite communications law. Current international satellite issues can
be divided between the fixed-satellite and mobile-satellite services. Those divisions correspond to the
physical characteristics of the receiving station and
the frequencies each type of system utilizes in transmitting messages over its facilities. In the fixed-satellite arena, Pan American Satellite's ("PanAmSat")
relationship with both Comsat and INTELSAT and
resulting industry ramifications are analyzed. Recent
regulation of direct broadcast service ("DBS") and
related technological issues are also examined. Next,
this Comment studies the mobile-satellite service,
particularly the frequency, technical, and political iswhich will serve maritime commercial and safety needs of the
United States and foreign countries." International Maritime
Satellite Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 751-57, at 751(a)

(1988).

CSA § 401, 47 U.S.C. § 741.
" In Re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 2 FCC Rcd. 5208,
para. 17 (1987).
12

Price, Schedule are Keys; Rocket Companies Gear Up
For $2 Billion in Satellite Launces, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 28,
1988, at 2. Several of the traditional equipment suppliers of
NASA, such as McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta and General Dynamics, have entered the competitive launch market as
have some small start-up companies, like Orbital Sciences.
Launches may also be provided by foreign entities, such as Europe's Arianespace.
" Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 89-CIV-5021, Complaint Jury Trial
Demand (S.D.N.Y. filed July 25, 1989); Petition for Rulemaking of Pan American Satellite Petition to Modify Commission
Policies Established in CC Docket No. 84-1299 Relating to Separate Satellite Systems, RM-7562; PanAmSat, White Paper, A
14
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sues surrounding low-earth orbiting ("LEO") satellites, including Motorola's IRIDIUM and INMARSAT's Project 21. Lastly, this Comment analyzes the
direction in which technology and competition will
drive regulation as the United States heads into the
twenty-first century.
I.

FIXED-SATELLITE SERVICE

A.

Pan American
Competitor

1.

PamAmSat's JudicialAttempt to Even the Playing Field

An

Satellite:

Emerging

PanAmSat has assumed the role of Comsat's principal rival in the newly competitive international satellite industry. Hoping to break Comsat's former
monopoly over the domestic and international satellite communications market, it has repeatedly asserted, before both courts and regulators, that Comsat's conduct is monopolistic and predatory and that
INTELSAT's treaty status is obsolete. 5
On July 25, 1989, PanAmSat filed an antitrust
complaint against Comsat in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 6
The complaint was dismissed' on the ground that,
as a signatory to INTELSAT, Comsat was immune
from suit under Article XV of the INTELSAT
agreement' 8 and the International Organizations Immunities Act.' 9 However, the court pointed out that
antitrust prohibitions nevertheless related to Comsat's role as a common carrier because § 102 of the
CSA contained an antitrust consistency clause.20
New, Private EnterpriseINTELSAT, (Apr. 20, 1992) [hereinafter PanAmSat White Paper]; Petition to Reopen Proceeding in
the Corporate Structure and Operations of the Communications
Satellite Corporation, CC Docket No. 80-634, Rpt. No. 1-6691
(May 12, 1992) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).

11 See Alpha Lyracom, Complaint Jury Trial Demand,
supra note 15.

17 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 68 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 405 (1989)

[hereinafter Alpha Lyracom].
18 "[Elach Party shall grant to these individuals [Parties,
representatives of parties, Signatories and representatives of sig-

natories] immunity from legal process in respect of acts done and
words written or spoken in the exercise of their functions and
within the limits of their duties . . . " Article XV(c), Int'l Telecommunications Satellite Organization, Aug. 20, 1971, 23
U.S.T. 3813 [hereinafter INTELSAT Agreement].
19 Alpha Lyracom, 68 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F), at 411. "Inter-

national

organizations .

.

. shall enjoy .

.

. immunity

from suit

and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments .. . " 22 U.S.C. § 288a (b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
20
Alpha Lyracom, at 407.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held the dismissal on immunity
grounds was appropriate, but nonetheless reversed
and remanded the case to allow PanAmSat to file an
amended complaint in which conduct not shielded by
immunity could be alleged-that is, conduct undertaken in Comsat's role as a common carrier.2 1 On
November 13, 1991, PanAmSat filed its second
amended complaint. 2 In the complaint, PanAmSat
again asserted that Comsat monopolized and participated in a conspiracy to monopolize the international
satellite market. 3 However, PanAmSat emphasized
Comsat's role as a common carrier and sole provider
of access to INTELSAT. PanAmSat further maintained that Comsat engaged in preemptive conduct
around the globe which resulted in damage to
PanAmSat's business and reputation.2 4
Shortly after the amended complaint was filed,
PanAmSat filed a petition for writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court.2 5 In its Brief for
Respondent in Opposition, Comsat agreed with both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals in their
crafting of a "narrowly drawn immunity based, in
part, upon the express immunity provisions in the
INTELSAT Agreements."126 Comsat contended that

its primary role was that of signatory to INTELSAT, and that the purpose of that organization was
to promote global satellite telecommunications efficiency and competition.2 7

Comsat asked that the

Court deny PanAmSat's petition,28 and on February
24, 1992, PanAmSat's petition for certiorari was denied. 29 Oral argument on the second amended com-

plaint took place in October 1992. On March 30,
Comsat's Motion to Dismiss PanAmSat's Complaint
2 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 946 F.2d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 1991).
22 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 89-CIV-5021, Second Amended Complaint Jury Trial Demand (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 13, 1991) (on
file with CommLaw Conspectus).
2 Id. at 30.
24

Id. at 24.

Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., petition for cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.

1174 (1992).
28
Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., Brief for Respondent in Opposition at
17, 112 S. Ct. 1174 (1992) (U.S. Jan 22, 1992) (No. 91-1038)
(on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
11 Id. at 18.
28

Id. at 30.

Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1174 (1992).
o INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 18, art. XIV.
Id. In fact, Comsat is the vehicle by which those separate
21
2'

was denied and discovery was ordered to commence.
2. PanAmSat's Efforts to Remove the Ban on Separate Systems
As part of the INTELSAT Agreements, satellite
service providers who were not INTELSAT signatories, so called "separate systems," were prohibited
from interconnecting with the public switched telephone network."0 Separate systems were, however,
permitted to "establish, acquire or utilize space segment facilities separate from the INTELSAT space
segment facilities [as long as these systems] furnish
all relevant information to and ...

consult with the

Assembly" prior to initiating action."1 The purpose
of both policies was two-fold: (1) to protect the
global satellite network from a technical perspective,
and (2) to spare INTELSAT from significant economic harm.32
In July 1990, PanAmSat asked the Commission to
unilaterally remove the separate systems restrictions." Comsat, in its opposition to PanAmSat's Petition for Rulemaking,3 4 asserted that the Executive
branch had jurisdiction over the INTELSAT Agreements and related separate systems matters.35 Comsat further delineated the process through which the
United States government had gone in order to outline its policy goals within the separate systems
framework, citing an Executive branch letter
("Baker-Mosbacher Letter")36 and a white paper
prepared by the Senior Interagency Group on International Communications and Information Policy
("SIG White Paper").37 Comsat argued that coordination of separate systems with 100 or fewer circuits
systems pass through the consultation process. SIG White Paper,
supra note 7.
32 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 18, art. XIV.
"

Petition for Rule Making of Pan American Satellite to

Modify Commission Policies Established in CC Docket No. 841299 Relating to Separate Satellite Systems, RM-7562, 6 FCC
Rcd. 5 (1990).
"' In re Pan American Satellite Petition for Rulemaking to
Modify Commission Policies Established in CC Docket No. 841299 Relating to Separate Systems, Opposition of Comsat to Petition for Rule Making, RM-7562, (Jan. 31, 1991) (on file with
CommLaw Conspectus).
35
36

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.

'7 The SIG White Paper on New International Satellite
Systems examined the United States' policy objectives within the
aegis of the Communications Act of 1934, the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962 and the United States' participation in INTELSAT. Id. at 3-4. "The SIG is composed of representatives
of the Departments of State, Justice, Defense and Commerce;

the Offices of Management and Budget, Science and Technol-
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interconnected with INTELSAT was a gradual and
effective method of integrating separate systems into
the global network.3 8 It also suggested that any further lifting of the interconnection ban be coordinated
within the environs of INTELSAT. 9 Accordingly,
the Commission routed PanAmSat's Petition for
Rulemaking to the Executive Branch.
On November 27, 1991, in accordance with the
Bush Administration's pro-competitive policy stance,
Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of
Commerce Robert Mosbacher sent a joint letter to
FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes outlining an incremental approach to integrating the separate systems.4"
PanAmSat subsequently withdrew its Petition in
light of this letter realizing the mootness of its argument. In November of 1992, INTELSAT's Assembly of Parties met and determined that switched services up to the level of 1,250 equivalent circuits per
satellite would not cause significant harm to INTELSAT."' Accordingly, in a January 8, 1993 joint
letter from the United States Coordinator for International Communication and Information Policy and
the Assistant Secretary for Commerce and Information, to FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes, United States
policy regarding separate systems was further modified to align it with the decision made by the INTELSAT Parties.42 That letter did not modify the
Baker-Mosbacher Letter which asserted all separate
systems interconnection restrictions would be lifted
by 1997.' 3
3.

PanAmSat's White Paper on INTELSAT Delivered to Congress

On April 20, 1992, PanAmSat submitted a White
Paper to Congress entitled A New, Private Enterogy, Policy, Policy Development, and the U.S. Trade Representative; the National Security Council; The Central Intelligence
Agency; the U.S. Information Agency (USIA); the Board for In-

ternational Broadcasting; the Agency for International Development; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration."
SIG White Paper, supra note 7, at 1 n.1.
" Opposition of Comsat to Petition for Rule Making, supra
note 34, at 15 n.35.
39 Id. at 16.
Letter from the Honorable James Baker and the Honora40
ble Robert Mosbacher to Chairman Alfred Sikes (Nov. 27,
1991) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus). PanAmSat withdrew its petition in light of this letter realizing the mootness of
its argument.
41 Slippery Slope?: Intelsat's 'Monopoly' Status Being Challenged Anew, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 25, 1993, at 2.
42 Letter from the United States Coordinator for Int'l Communications and Information Policy, Dept. of State, Bradley P.
Holmes and Assistant Secretary for Communications and Infor-
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prise INTELSAT."' PanAmSat claimed INTELSAT's immunity from suit conferred commercial
benefits and therefore its immunity and treaty status
must be stripped. 5 PanAmSat's White Paper contended it was inherently unfair that INTELSAT
have it both ways by being "a specially privileged
treaty organization, immune from any nation's competition laws and regulatory over-sight, and a harddriving commercial competitor ....

-4'However, op-

position to PanAmSat's argument can be found in
the SIG White Paper describing the Bush Administration's "separate systems" policy whereby change
is facilitated by allowing INTELSAT to become
competitive, rather than by allowing separate systems to enter the market. 7 As of April 1, 1993,
neither INTELSAT nor Comsat had replied to the
allegations made in PanAmSat's White Paper.
PanAmSat's Petition to FCC to Reopen Structure Proceeding

4.

On May 12, 1992, PanAmSat filed a Petition to
Reopen Proceedingwith the Commission asking it to
reexamine the corporate structure and operations of
Comsat.4 8 PanAmSat argued that the dual role of
Comsat as common carrier and INTELSAT signatory was a conflict of interest and gave Comsat competitive advantages in violation of the Sherman AntiTrust Act.4" It further stated that the Commission
should divide Comsat's services into monopoly and
competitive baskets,5" maintaining: (1) monopoly
services were those services that separate systems did
not, or could not, offer; (2) competitive services were
those that separate systems did, or could, offer; and
(3) fiber optic services should be excluded from both
baskets. 5'
mation, Dept. of Commerce, Gregory F. Chapados to Chairman
Alfred Sikes (Jan. 8, 1993) (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus).
43 Letter from the Honorable James Baker, supra note 40.
44 PanAmSat White Paper, supra note 15.
45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Petition to Reopen Proceedingin the Corporate Structure

and Operations of the Communications Satellite Corporation,
CC Docket No. 80-634 at 1 (May 12, 1992) (on file with
CommLaw Conspectus).
49 Comsat had filed a petition previously with the Commission requesting that it implement incentive regulations for multi-

year switched voice services based on the fact that competition
was abundant in this service area. That petition is cited by PAS
as evidence of Comsat's "changed circumstances." Id. at 13.
50

Id.

11

Id. at 15.
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In its reply, Comsat asserted two propositions.
First, it maintained that the so-called monopoly services were not, in actuality, monopoly services because satellite service was competing with cable-a
fact it claimed was ignored by PanAmSat. Second,
assuming arguendo that monopoly services existed,
lifting of interconnection restrictions on the separate
systems would make those services satisfactorily competitive. 2 Comsat's position was that its role as a
common carrier was dependent upon its role as a
signatory; that the essence of its signatory role was to
pursue United States' interests; and that one of the
United States' primary interests was global satellite
competition. 53 If the task of signatory was not fulfilled adequately, the United States' alternative
would be to find another signatory, an action which
would be counter-productive to the goal of competition and the existence of Comsat. 54 In fact, because
Comsat is regulated as a common carrier, on a rateof-return basis, the argument could be made that it
is actually at a competitive disadvantage.
Direct Broadcast Satellite Service

B.

DBS is a programming delivery system which is
beamed directly to a user's home via high power
satellites and relatively small-eighteen inches to
three feet-receive stations, or dishes.55 Prior to the
development of these high power satellites, it was
necessary to utilize a very large and expensive
dish-ten to twelve feet-to receive transmissions,
because the size of the dish related inversely to the
power of the satellite. 56 The new, smaller dishes
should be more acceptable to the general public since
they will be both less expensive and less unsightly
than their larger predecessor's.57 In National Assoc.
of Broadcasters v. FCC,58 the United States Court of
" Petition to Reopen Proceeding,supra note 48; Opposition
of Communications Satellite Corporation, CC Docket No. 80634, at i (July 6, 1992) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
" See generally Opposition of Comsat, supra note 52.

8

Id. at 14.

Michelle Browne, Bringing It All Home With Direct
Broadcast Satellites, NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 28, 1983, at 94.
Id.
56
8
FCC, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE SERVICE (au-

thored by Mark Solberg) (1992) (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus).
" National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190

(D.C. Cir. 1984).
Il Id. at 1201.
60 National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d
665, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id.
61

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated
a portion of the underlying Commission decision,
which maintained that DBS providers were not engaged in broadcasting. The court's decision was
based on the fact that the Commission had departed
from its content-based approach of determining
whether an activity constituted broadcasting. Prior to
that decision, the Commission's test was to determine
whether an intent for public distribution and programming of interest to the general audience had
been provided. 59 In the years since the NAB decision, the Commission adopted new indicia of intent.
Today, the Commission focuses on the transmission
and receipt techniques to determine if an activity is
broadcasting.6 0 Those criteria were upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals in 1988.6"
Unlike cable service, DBS service subscribers will
have a dish compatible with all other service providers. 2 Even DBS service providers who intend to
scramble their signals and operate on a pay-per-view
basis could avail themselves of all subscribers.6 3
Dishes will be addressable6 4 and, through a tiny chip
in the receiver, a subscriber's decoder will unscram65
ble the signal and thus allow transmission.
To date, nine companies have been granted construction permits to provide DBS service.6 6 USSB,
Hughes, Advanced and Echostar have been assigned
specific orbital positions and channels in accordance
with international treaties and agreements. 67 The remaining companies await position and channel assignment. In order to receive and retain its permit, a
DBS service company must operate with due diligence in two regards: (1) the DBS permittee must
begin construction or complete contracting for the
construction of its satellite(s) within one year of the
grant of its construction permit; and (2) the permittee must begin operation of its satellite(s) within six
62

Browne, supra note 55, at 94.

6

Id.

" The term "addressable" means access to programming is
restricted to subscribers only and the DBS system identifies subscribers by their actual location addresses.
Browne, supra note 55, at 94.
65
6
The companies who have been authorized by the FCC to
provide DBS are: (1) United States Satellite Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("USSB"); (2) Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc.
("Hughes"); (3) Advanced Communications Corporation ("Advanced"); (4) Echostar Satellite Corporation ("Echostar"); (5)
Continental Satellite Corporation ("Continental"); (6) Directsat
Corporation ("Directsat"); (7) Direct Broadcast Satellite Corporation ("DBSC"); (8) Tempo Satellite, Inc. ("Tempo"); (9) Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. ("Dominion"). FCC, DIRECT
BROADCAST SATELLITE SERVICE, supra note 57.
67

Id.
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years of the grant of its construction permit."' These
companies anticipate operation will commence in
1994-1995.69

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act") 7" includes a section regarding DBS. It provides that the
FCC must initiate a rulemaking to impose DBS
public interest standards. In addition, it mandates as
a condition for initial authorization or renewal that
four to seven percent of DBS channel capacity be set
aside for noncommercial educational programming. 7
It has been speculated that the 1992 Cable Act "will
ease DBS entry into the market because program access provisions require that the FCC ensure that
programming be made available to satellite operators
at reasonable prices. '"72
Not only will DBS service compete with the more
traditional modes of broadcasting, but audio, video,
text and electronic mail services will be available to
areas where television reception is non-existent because of both the ease of installation and the relatively low cost of the small dishes.73 Use of DBS service can also be translated easily into the business
sector. Reports, memoranda and other important
business documents could be beamed from one end of
the globe to the other in minutes. To say that DBS'
global impact might be profound could turn out to
be an understatement.
II.

MOBILE-SATELLITE SERVICE

A.

A Brief Overview

Mobile-Satellite Service ("MSS") is a demand-assigned communications service which is both distance
and terrain insensitive. Those factors would enable
es
89

47 C.F.R. § 100.19 (1991).

FCC, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE SERVICE,

supra

note 57.
70 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
71 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
712 Satellite Finance Conference, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 2,
1992, at 3; H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 71, § 628.
" It is estimated that two to three million farms and ranches
receive no television signals due to remoteness or obstructive
mountainous terrains. Browne, supra note 55, at 94.
74 In re Amendment of Parts 2, 22 and 25 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum for and to Establish Other
Rules and Policies Pertaining to the Mobile Satellite Service for
the Provision of Various Common Carrier Services, Tentative
Decision, 6 FCC Rcd. 4900, para. 57, n.88 (1991), aff'd, 70
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 271 (1992).
76 Id.
7 Jim Foley, Iridium: Key to Worldwide Cellular Commu-
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users to communicate from virtually anywhere on
the globe. Thus, users would no longer be tied to
regional transmission areas. MSS can be relayed
over two types of satellites orbiting in various heights
and inclinations-geostationary orbiting satellites
satellites
orbiting
low-earth
and
("GEOs")
("LEOs"). GEOs are located over the equatorial
plane at approximately 22,000 miles above the earth
and match the earth's orbit; LEOs, on the other
hand, operate in a much lower orbit and pass over
many countries as the earth rotates. 74 To provide
continuous coverage, LEO satellites either hand off
signals as one disappears over the horizon and another appears 75 or use more sophisticated, digital inter-satellite links. 7' LEOs' attractiveness lies in its
lower cost, smaller size and easier launch capability
than the traditional GEO. 77 In addition, LEOs can
service
satellite
radiodetermination
provide
78
("RDSS") which can locate a mobile unit at any
spot on the globe. RDSS transmits a signal from a
small transceiver in the mobile unit to the satellite
and then onward to a map that identifies each trans79
ceiver and its location.
The Commission divided LEO providers into two
types-Large LEOs and Small LEOs-and allocated separate spectrums to each."0 Large LEOs are
capable of providing voice, data and other types of
communications, whereas Small LEOs are data,
message and RDSS capable only." Originally, the
Commission deemed the LEO system technically infeasible for MSS because of both the large number
of satellites required and the extreme difficulty in coordinating frequency allocations world-wide.8 2 However, when several corporations applied to the Commission for permission to offer LEO MSS, the
nications, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Oct. 1991, at 23.
71 See generally In re Amendment of Section 2.106 of the
Commission's Rules to Allocate the 1610-1625.5 MHz and the
2483.5-2500 MHz Bands for Use by the Mobile Satellite Service, Including Non-Geostationary Satellites, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making and Tentative Decision, 7 FCC Rcd. 6414 (1992).
78
78

Id. para. 13.

Nordwall, Mobile Satellite Firms Expect Strong Iarket
Growth in 1990, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Dec. 19,
1988, at 89.
80 Commission Submits Advance Publication of LEOs to
IRFB, Public Notice, 1991 FCC LEXIS 6698 (Dec. 17, 1991).
The structure for licensing of LEOs is unclear at this point. The
Commission will deal with the technical issues first. Rulemaking
regarding licensing formats will be addressed at a later date. In
re Amendment of Section 2.106, supra note 77, para. 19.
s' Id.

82
In re Amendment of Parts 2, 22 and 25, supra note 74, at
paras. 57, 58, n.91.
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Commission reconsidered its position.83 Consequently, at the World Administrative Radio Conference held in Spain in February 1992 ("WARC
1992"), the allocation of spectrum for MSS was one
of the most crucial issues on the agenda.
B.

WARC Allocation of Frequency

WARC is the World Administrative Radio Conference organized by the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), an arm of the United Nations.84 When WARC met in February 1992, it was
scheduled to handle many MSS issues which had not
been addressed during the service-specific WARC
conferences held during the 1980s.8 5 A major item
on the agenda was the "need to co-ordinate allocation of frequencies that could affect other services." 8
As only a limited amount of spectrum is currently
available because most of it is already occupied by
users, the question of coordinated allocation with
members of the ITU was of primary importance.
At WARC 1992, the United States proposed the
allocation of 1610-1626.5 MHz of spectrum to MSS
for use by either GEOs or other non-geostationary
systems like LEOs. 8 7 The proposal was accepted by
the attendees and, in addition, the 2483.5-2500
MHz band was also allocated to MSS.88 These
lower frequencies were preferred for both financial
and technical reasons:8 9 (1) in order to operate compatibly with cellular services, which currently utilize
low frequencies; and (2) to allow the manufacture of
dual capacity mobile telephones at a reasonable
price.9 While these newly allocated bands will not
be included in the international frequency allocation
chart until WARC's Final Acts are signed in October 1993,91 coordination of the spectrum allocations
can begin immediately. 2

Id.

86

Id.

87

FCC,

EARTH

SPECTRUM

ORBIT

ALLOCATION

SATELLITES,

No

PROPOSED
PIONEER

FOR

Low

PREFERENCE

AWARDED, Rpt.

No. DC-2200, Action in Docket Case 92-28
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FCC Allocation of Frequency

Following the decisions of WARC, the Commission proposed frequency allocations for MSS, including LEOs "which would implement decisions made
at [the] 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference . . . . " The Commission maintained that
"[t]his proposed new allocation would permit the
provision of services by utilizing LEOs. It is expected that LEOs would accommodate demand for
mobile communications services at low cost because
of the low power requirements and simplified receiver technology that can be used with the low
' The FCC established an
Earth orbiting satellites." 94
industry advisory committee to negotiate proposed
regulations for the operation of GEOs and non-geostationary systems in the 1610-1625.5 MHz and
2483.5-2500 MHz bands. 5 Given the history of
MSS and the Commission's initial reluctance to consider LEO systems, it is interesting to note that five
out of the six applicants to construct and launch
MSS ultimately proposed LEO systems."6
D.

Motorola's IRIDIUM System

"Named for the element with 77 electrons circling
its nucleus," 9 Motorola's IRIDIUM system offers
the largest and most comprehensive LEO service.
IRIDIUM was initially intended to be a 77-satellite
system for global mobile communications operated
by an international consortium. 98 On August 8,
1992, Motorola filed a Minor Amendment with the
Commission decreasing the number of active space
vehicles from seventy-seven to sixty-six. 99
It is Motorola's plan that the IRIDIUM system
be both cellular and satellite capable. The system is
described by management as being "consumer
driven, [with] customers using pocket-size hand-held
94
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Foley, supra note 76, at 23.
A spokesman for Loral's Globalstar system indicated that
global partnerships are the only viable alternative for LEO service because of multiple billing concerns and resulting consumer
confusion. Can Everyone Survive? With WARC Allocations,
Mobile Fight Has Just Begun, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 16, 1992,

at 5, 6.
" In re Application of Motorola Satellite Communications,
Inc. for Authority to Construct, Launch and Operate a Low
Earth Obit Satellite System in the RDSS Uplink Bank, Minor
Amendment, File No. 9-DSSP-91; CSS-91-010, (Aug. 8, 1992)
(on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
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phones compatible with existing cellular networks.
[The] Iridium system would be activated only if [the]
The
customer couldn't reach a cellular signal."'
satellite segment would operate as a mirror image of
the cellular segment. Instead of a user moving
through the cells, which occurs during cellular calling, the cells-using LEO technology-would move
across the user.' 0 l
Usage costs could be a stumbling block to IRIDIUM's commercial success.'0 2 Other providers of the
LEO mobile satellite service in competition with
IRIDIUM claim that LEO services must be priced
in close proximity to cellular services,103 otherwise it
would be impossible to be competitive.'0 4 Motorola
has had some difficulty enticing foreign firms and
post, telegraph and telecommunications administrations ("PTTs") to invest in its system."' However, a
January 27, 1993 announcement stated that a meeting of eighteen of twenty-one "intended investors"
had been held in Geneva. Although the names of
those investors were not released, Motorola maintained that all had either signed "subscription agreements or letters of intent."' 0 6
E. INMARSAT's Project 21
Commonly seen and referred to as a potential contender to Motorola's IRIDIUM is INMARSAT's
Project 21. Until recently, Project 21 was a thinktank/research project set up by INMARSAT to assess the technical and commercial viability of a
global mobile telephone system. 10 7 The first real details of the project were revealed at the World Space
Congress in September 1992 by project engineer
Ahmad Ghais.' 8 Mr. Ghais announced that "Pro100
101

Can Everyone Survive?, supra note 98, at 6.
Foley, supra note 76, at 23.

Can Everyone Survive?, supra note 98, at 6.
Id.
104
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106 Motorola's Iridium Is Set On Collision Course With INMARSAT, FINTECH MOBILE COMM., Jan 16, 1992; Prospective Providers Disagree, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 15, 1992, at 3.
Motorola Chairman Robert Kinzie has said, "Motorola is committed to making Iridium happen .... '" Can Everyone Survive,
supra note 98, at 5.
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July 13, 1992, at 1, 2.
108 Project 21: INMARSAT May Fight For Narrow MISS
Spectrum Band - or lay Not, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 4, 1992,
at 1.
.09 These briefcase satellite telephones were not commercially available as of April 1, 1993. Id. at 1.
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ject 21 will incorporate existing Inmarsat-C portable
mobile data service introduced in 1991, Inmarsat-M
briefcase telephone to be introduced in late 1992,1"'
global satellite paging system to be introduced in
1994, as well as [a] new system, Inmarsat-P, scheduled for implementation in 1998. ' 10 In November
1992, at INMARSAT's 44th Council Session, the
Council approved a schedule for further market and
technical studies relating to the Inmarsat-P and Inmarsat-M programs."' The Council concluded that
Inmarsat-P was technically feasible and subsequently set up studies to determine which satellite
systems and orbital configurations would best suit
the global hand-held satellite phone system. 2
Motorola is taking INMARSAT's interest in
global mobile telephony very seriously. Motorola
claimed that any such system provided by INMARSAT "has the potential to create barriers to entry
[into business] which could stifle private competitive
initiatives."' 3 In letters to various governmental officials," 4 Motorola has asked that INMARSAT's entry into the global mobile telephony market be restricted." 5 Motorola claimed that INMARSAT's
position "as [an] intergovernmental organization
could lead to monopoly and could further narrow the
spectrum available for private MSS/RDSS systems.,"" The spectrum reserved for such services is
narrow and competitors are concerned there will be
insufficient spectrum for all players." 7
In a related development, Motorola proposed to
the Commission that it allocate two-thirds of the
spectrum available for MSS/RDSS to its own
IRIDIUM system. The remaining one-third, was to8
11
be split among the other four LEO applicants.
Ironically, given Motorola's claim of monopolistic
Inmarsat-P is a global hand-held satellite phone system
which is an integral part of Inmarsat's Project 21 strategy. INMARSAT To Move Ahead Rapidly With Global Hand-Held
Satellite Phone System, INMARSAT News Release, Nov. 11,
1992 (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
"' Comsat Memorandum to Participants in the Open Meeting on INMARSAT Council 44, Nov. 18, 1992, at 3 (on file
10

with CommLaw Conspectus).
112 INMARSAT To Move Ahead Rapidly, supra note 110.
11
Iridium Takes On INMARSAT, supra note 107, at 1.
114
Letters were sent to Vice President Dan Quayle, Secretary of State James Baker, Asst. Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger, National Security Council Head Brent Scowcroft,
Commerce Secretary Barbara Franklin, Council of Economic
Advisers Head Michael Boskin and others. Id.
115 Id.
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conduct by INMARSAT, those objecting to the
sharing idea alleged that Motorola's proposal was itself exclusionary. l 9 One Loral official, whose
Globalstar LEO system is a competitor of Motorola,
stated Motorola's position was akin to saying, "We
take the good stuff, and we'll find you some left over
clothes somewhere."1 20 Recently, however, Motorola
tempered its insistence on this spectrum sharing proposal. In early February 1993, Motorola promised to
use less spectrum, which would not only reduce the
number of potential users of its IRIDIUM system,
but would also be a first step toward a final spectrum sharing arrangment 21
III.

RESULTS OF
EXPLOSION

TECHNOLOGICAL

Current developments in available services and
emerging technologies in today's satellite world are
numerous and ongoing. Only a select few have been
examined here. It is equally apparent that, in most
respects, the Commission is managing to keep
abreast of these rapid developments. The vast number of proposed rulemaking dockets in the recent
past attest to that fact. Congress is also marching to
the regulatory beat, as evidenced by the recent veto
override of the Cable bill. It is quite possible that
with competition becoming fierce, and new satellite
services emerging, legislative as well as executive
players will be involved in future regulatory
processes.
The United States satellite regulatory scheme, as
the world has known it in the past, contended with
only one player-Comsat. PanAmSat's multiple efforts to shine light on what it considers a dimly lit
playing field could result in changes in the direction
of satellite regulation. If PanAmSat prevails in its
antitrust suit over Comsat, it stands to receive damages and publicity worth millions of dollars. Although it is difficult to predict how the court will
rule on PanAmSat's complaint, given the United
States' pro-competitive stance regarding its obligations within the INTELSAT consortium, it is likely
that PanAmSat's arguments will fail. In any event,
PanAmSat's efforts and success in lifting the separate systems ban can be viewed as a victory, or alternatively, from Comsat's and the previous Administration's perspective, as a natural result of global
SAT, supra note 107, at 2.
110
Spectrum Leftovers? LEO Competitors Object to Motorola Spectrum Sharing Proposal, COMM. DAILY, June 16, 1992,

at 2, 3.

competition. From either viewpoint, the fact remains
that the ultimate downfall of the separate systems
ban has forever altered the picture of global satellite
competition. Whatever the results in each of PanAmSat's attempts to open the way for competition, it appears that PanAmSat will be a major satellite competitor in the years to come. This factor alone will
contribute to the approach taken by the Commission
in formulating its regulatory framework into the
1990s.
DBS services, although not presently a high-demand service, may well give television and cable
companies competition in the future. Indeed, Hubbard Broadcasting Chairman Stanley Hubbard predicted that subscribers to DBS will far outnumber
cable subscribers by the year 2000.122 The Commission has adopted a relaxed regulatory stand with regard to DBS, and will likely continue in this mode
at least until the implementation dates of DBS providers arrive. At that point, other related technologies,
such as HDTV, will probably have matured to the
point where the Commission will step in to guide the
industry.
The new satellite services arriving in the marketplace may drastically alter the framework of the
communications industry as it stands today. Portable
hand-held telephones invisibly connected to LEO
satellites could revolutionize the inter-personal communications world. Although there may arise some
problems with regard to frequency allocation and orbital positioning when new competitors attempt to
enter that market, it is likely that some sort of consortium will develop to avoid these types of technical
difficulties.
IV.

COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The United States is about to enter a new era in
satellite communications. Given the advances in satellite communications technology currently on the
brink of commercial application, it is likely that a
new or at least a modified regulatory scheme will be
implemented as the United States enters the next
century. FCC Commissioner James Quello, in a
speech at the Michigan Public Service Commission's
Policy Conference, said "Advanced technology often
outstrips society's ability to integrate it into our al120
121
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Answer the Unanswerable, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 23,

1992, at 2, 3.
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ready complex, sometimes expensive, communications systems. ' Commissioner Quello proceeded to
predict that by 2002, "most services now provided by
wire 'will be provided over the air and vice
versa.'"124 While delivery systems "require orderly,

prioritized spectrum allocations and interference control and, thus, continued regulations," 1 2 5 broadcast"substantially deregulated" in the years
ing will be
26
to come.

1

agenda. While it remains to be seen how the new
Administration will affect the regulatory stand the
Commission will take as we enter the twenty-first
century, FCC Commissioner Duggan has predicted
that the Clinton Administration will leave unchanged the direction in which the Commission is
heading because "a bipartisan consensus has formed
around the idea of competition rather than
regulation.'
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Regulation, or deregulation, depends largely on a
particular Administration's or Congress' political
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